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DEPOSIT GUARANTY NATIONAL BANK V. ROPER
AND UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION V.
GERAGHTY: SOLUTION FOR OR CONFUSION
OF CLASS ACTION MOOTNESS?
The class action is an important procedural device in the American
legal system.1 Class actions preserve judicial resources by allowing the
adjudication of a large number of individual claims in a single action.2
Class actions also provide access to the court system to claimants who,
because of the cost of litigation, would find individual access economi-
cally infeasible.'
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes when a
group may take advantage of class action procedures.4 Upon motion for
class certification, the presiding district court determines whether the
action is maintainable as a class action.' The court's determination in-
volves consideration of the manageability of the putative class, the
nature of the claims asserted, and the ability of the named plaintiff to
represent the interests of the class.' The district court will certify the
suit as a class action if the court finds the action can be so maintained.'
1 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (1972) [herein-
after cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
2 Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363, 371 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975);
Note, United Airlines v. McDonald: Class Certification and the "Uncertain Sound," 11 J.
MAR. L. REV. 635, 635-36 (1978).
Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Subdivision (a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative par-
ties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
Id. Subdivision (b) requires a maintainable class action to fall into one of three categories.
The first category consists of class actions brought to avoid individual suits that might sub-
ject the defendant to conflicting judgments or might impair the separate members of the
class in protecting their rights. Under the second category, a suit brought by a group of in-
dividuals seeking injunctive or declaratory relief for the group as a whole is maintainable as
a class action. The final category allows class actions in which putative class members raise
common questions of law and fact. The common questions must predominate over individual
matters in the case and the class action must be the best procedure to adjudicate the con-
troversy. Id.
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Subdivision (c)(1) provides that as soon as practicable after com-
mencement of an action brought as a class action, the district court must determine whether
the class action is maintainable. Id.; see Weisman v. MCA, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 260 (D. Del.
1968) (district court judge must determine maintainability as soon as practicable).
'See note 4 supra.
See 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1785.
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If the district court finds the class action is not maintainable and
denies certification, the fate of the putative class depends on an appeal
of the ruling. Given the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,8 the success of an appeal of an adverse
certification ruling is uncertain. In Livesay, the Court denied interlocu-
tory appeal of a certification ruling.' The Court rejected the "death
knell" doctrine," which allowed the interlocutory appeal of an order
when that order effectively ended the entire action.11 While alternative
methods of interlocutory appeal are available, these methods are rarely
successful."
Where denial of certification results in dismissal of the entire action,
the ruling is final and the plaintiff can appeal immediately." The ruling is
not final, however, where the named plaintiffs may continue their indi-
vidual claims after certification denial. When the certification ruling is
not final, absent class members may intervene as plaintiffs, file private
actions, or seek appeal of the certification ruling." If absent class mem-
' 437 U.S. 463 (1978), rev'g, Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir.
1977).
437 U.S. at 477; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) (circuit courts have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions).
11 The Second Circuit developed the "death knell" doctrine in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). The doctrine,
derived from the collateral order concept of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949), is an exception to the finality requirement of § 1291. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976); see
370 F.2d at 120. The "death knell" doctrine allows immediate appeal of the district court's
denial of class certification where the ruling effectively ends the action. Until Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), the doctrine applied to groups of claimants with
small claims who could not afford to pursue an appeal of their certification ruling. See 370
F.2d at 120. For in-depth studies of the "death knell" doctrine, see Cohen, "Not Dead But
Only Sleeping". The Rejection of the Death Knell Doctrine and the Survival of Class Ac-
tions Denied Certification, 59 B.U.L. REV. 257 (1979); Comment, Appealability of a Class Ac-
tion Dismissa- The "Death Knell" Doctrine, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 403 (1972); Note, Prejudg-
ment Order Denying Class Action Status Is Not Appealable, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 292.
" 437 U.S. at 469.
" See Note, Interlocutory Appeal From Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1292 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Interlocutory Appeal] (general discussion of
avenues of interlocutory appeal of denial of class certification). Under § 1292(b), federal
district courts may certify an order for appeal if the order involves a disputed controlling
question of law that may materially advance the end of the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
Upon the district court's certification, the circuit court has discretion to permit appeal of
the order. Id. Both district and circuit courts exercise judicial self-restraint in allowing a §
1292(b) appeal. See Interlocutory Appeal, supra at 1296. A second avenue to interlocutory
review is the writ of mandamus. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976), allows a circuit
court to order a district court to certify a class if the district court's decision is extremely
abusive. Issuance of a writ of mandamus, however, is rare. Interlocutory Appeal, supra at
1298-99.
"3 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1978).
14 See Comment, Resurrecting Claims Through Post-Judgment Appeal of Class Cer-
tification Denial, 64 IOWA L. REV. 964, 964 (1979) (discussion of appeal of certification denial
after final judgment on named plaintiffs individual claim).
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bers seek appeal of the ruling, they may intervene in the action and wait
for a final judgment. As an alternative the class members may await ap-
peal by the named plaintiff after final judgment."5
Absent class members who wait for a post-judgment appeal of the
certification ruling risk defendant induced mootness, known as "buying
off." 8 "Buying off" occurs when the defendant satisfies the named plain-
tiff's personal claim before the successful certification of the class
action.17 The defendant seeks to avoid the multiple claims of a class by
rendering the class action moot."8
Mootness results from a litigant's failure to meet the case or contro-
versy limitations of article III of the United States Constitution. 9 A
principal aspect of the article III limitations is the personal stake re-
quirement. Each party to an action must have a personal stake in the
outcome of the litigation."0 An act or event that satisfies a party's per-
sonal stake eliminates that party's claim. Most class action mootness
problems arise when the named plaintiff loses his personal stake.2' Case
" See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 396 (1977) (absent class member
allowed to appeal certification ruling after final judgment of named plaintiffs' action).
" See Note, Averting Defendant-InducedPre-Certification Mootness of Class Actions,
55 CHL-KENT L. REV. 793, 808 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Defendant-Induced Mootness].
17 1&.
II Id.
19 Historically, mootness was a common law doctrine that held courts powerless to
decide nonexistent disputes. Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390 (1900). The lack of power
resulted from the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937), the Supreme Court provided the earliest indication of
constitutional grounds for the mootness doctrine. In dictum, the Court distinguished a
justiciable controversy from a hypothetical or moot case. Id. Not until 1964, however, did
the Court explicitly base the mootness doctrine on article III. Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S.
301, 306 n.3 (1964); see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (case or controversy clause). By 1968, the
mootness doctrine was a "constitutional rule." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968);
see Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REv. 373, 375 n.12
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Mootness Doctrine].
The case or controversy limitations in article III have two purposes. The case or con-
troversy limitations seek to assure that federal courts will not infringe on an area commit-
ted to another branch of government, and that issues presented to federal courts will be in a
form capable of judicial resolution in an adversary context. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95
(1968). Courts employ the mootness doctrine to ensure adverseness. Id. The mootness doc-
trine takes into consideration the viability of the controversy between the parties and the
legally cognizable interest of the parties in the outcome of the action. Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). The legally cognizable interest required of the parties is referred to
as the personal stake requirement. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The general
wording of the case or controversy clause of article III results in the absence of constitu-
tional guidelines and makes incorporation of the mootness doctrine requirements an exer-
cise in self-restraint by the Supreme Court. Mootness Doctrine, supra at 375 n.12; Note,
Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1672, 1672 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Mootness on Appeal].
See note 19 supra.
" Comment, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts (pt. 2), 54 TEx.
L. REV. 1299, 1320-21 (1976). For discussions of mootness in class actions, see Bledsoe, Moot-
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law traditionally protected certified class actions from mootness.' Prior
to Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper' and United States Parole
Commission v. Geraghty,24 however, many jurisdictions found uncerti-
fied class actions moot when the named plaintiff's claim became moot.'
The cases of Roper and Geraghty clearly extend protection to uncerti-
fied class actions.
Roper involved two credit card holders who sued a Mississippi bank
for usury.26 The complaint alleged that the bank levied usurious finance
ness and Standing in Class Actions, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 430 (1973); Note, Does Mooting of
the Named Plaintiff Moot a Class Suit Commenced Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure?, 8 VAL. U.L. REV. 333 (1974).
' See note 25 infra.
445 U.S. 326 (1980), affg, Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978).
2' 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
The Supreme Court's decision in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), insulated certi-
fied class actions from the named plaintiff's mooted claim. Id. at 402-03. Sosna involved a
constitutional challenge of Iowa's residency requirement for divorces. Id. at 395; see IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.6 (West Supp. 1980) (divorce petitioner must be resident of Iowa for one
year). Pending appeal, the named plaintiff satisfied the residency requirement thereby
rendering her claim moot. Id. at 398. The Supreme Court held, however, that the named
plaintiff's satisfaction of the residency requirement did not render the class action moot. Id.
at 402. The Court ruled that upon proper certification, absent class members are vested
with a legal right separate from the named plaintiff's right. Id. at 399. The separate legal
right satisfies article III because a live controversy continues between the absent members
and the defendant. Id. at 401.
Following Sosna the Court's support for class actions appeared limited to those certi-
fied. This appearance was due to two cases, Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427
U.S. 424 (1976), and Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). In Spangler, the
mooted claims of the named students in an action attacking segregation rendered the entire
action moot because the students were never certified as a class. 427 U.S. at 430. In Jacobs,
the named plaintiff's mooted claim resulted in a mooted class because the district court
failed to certify the class action properly. 420 U.S. at 129. In Spangler and Jacobs, the
Supreme Court held uncertified class actions moot because of the named plaintiffs' mooted
claims. 427 U.S. at 430; 420 U.S. at 129. Jacobs and Spangler, however, left the mootness
question open in cases in which the district court specifically denied certification. The
Supreme Court decisions addressed only class actions in which certification was improper.
427 U.S. at 430; 420 U.S. at 129. With no clear standard for guidance, the circuit courts took
conflicting approaches to the mootness of a class action in which a district court specifically
had denied certification. Compare Armour v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 46, 48-49 (5th Cir.
1979), vacated, 445 U.S. 940 (1980 (court's discharge of named plaintiffs suit rendered
uncertified class action moot) and Winokur v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271, 277
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) (mooting of named plaintiff's claims deprived
court of jurisdiction to hear named plaintiffs' appeal of certification ruling) and Kuahulu v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977) (class action rendered moot
because named plaintiffs claim was mooted before certification) with Susman v. Lincoln
American Corp., 587 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980 (class ac-
tion pending motion for certification remained viable after named plaintiffs claim mooted)
and Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (4th Cir. 1978) (after named plaintiffs
claim mooted case remanded to dismiss class action or to allow another class member to
represent class).
In United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), the Supreme Court fore-
shadowed the Roper and Geraghty decisions. The McDonald cases concerned an interven-
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charges against the named plaintiffs and some 90,000 other card holders.2
Four years after the case began, the district court denied plaintiffs' mo-
tion to certify the class. The district court ruled that the action failed to
meet all of the Rule 23(b)(3) requirements.'
The district court certified its finding for possible interlocutory ap-
peal under section 1292(b) of title 28 of the United States Code.' The
named plaintiffs appealed the ruling to the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The Fifth Circuit denied appeal and the action proceeded as one
for the named plaintiffs only.30 Seven months later, the defendant
tendered to the named plaintiffs the full amount of each named plaintiff's
claim." The named plaintiffs refused the offer and made a counteroffer,
trying to reserve the right to appeal the certification ruling. The defen-
dant bank refused the counteroffer.2 Over the plaintiffs' objections, the
district court entered judgment for the named plaintiffs in the amount of
defendant's offer and dismissed the action. The named plaintiffs then
sought appeal of the certification ruling in the Fifth Circuit.'
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying certifi-
cation.3 4 The Fifth Circuit rejected the respondent bank's argument-that
the mooted claims of the named plaintiffs rendered the class action moot.
The holding relied on what the Fifth Circuit termed the class represen-
tative's fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the putative class.
3
1
The Supreme Court granted the bank's petition for certiorari on the
question of the class action's mootness.36 The Court, with Chief Justice
Burger writing for the majority, affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision.
3 7
The Court relied on its ruling in Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas &
ing class member's ability to appeal the denial of certification. Id. at 393-94. Allowing the
appeal, the Court stated in dictum that denial of certification removes the class action pro-
cedure from the suit. Id. at 394. The Court further stated that because the class action can
be revived on review, the class action is not treated as nonexistent. Id.
445 U.S. at 327.27 Id.
' 445 U.S. at 329 n.2. The district court in Roper found Federal Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)
inapplicable because of the nature of the class. See Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106,
1111 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (district court opinion unpublished). The
district court further found Rule 23(b)(3) inapplicable because of the availability of a state
forum, the magnitude of the aggregated claims, the fact that Mississippi law disfavors
aggregation of usury claims, and the unmanageable size of the class. 445 U.S. at 329 n.2.
See note 12 supra.
445 U.S. at 329.
31 Id.
Id. See generally Dole, The Settlement of Class Actions for Damages, 71 COLUM. L.
Ra.v. 971 (1971) (detailed study of class action settlements).
Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1106 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1110-11; accord, Defendant-Induced Mootness, supra note 16, at 808. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision on constitutional grounds rather than the Fifth Cir-
cuit's fiduciary duty grounds. See text accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 440 U.S. 945 (1979) (mem.).
445 U.S. at 340.
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Betts Co.' Electrical Fittings involved infringement of a patent. The
district court found that the defendant did not infringe plaintiff's patent
and that the patent was valid."9 The defendant moved to appeal the dis-
trict court's finding that the patent was valid. 0 The Supreme Court
allowed the defendant to appeal because the finding was procedural, un-
necessary to the judgment and could have adverse collateral estoppel
consequences upon the appellant."'
As in Electrical Fittings, the Roper Court found the certification rul-
ing to be procedural. 2 The Court held that a party prevailing on the
merits could appeal a ruling collateral to the merits if that party re-
tained a personal stake in the matter."3 The named plaintiffs in Roper
asserted that the economic interest in spreading the costs of litigation
among all the class members was their personal stake." The Court
agreed, viewing this economic interest as a personal stake sufficient to
satisfy article III."'
Besides holding that the named plaintiffs possessed a sufficient per-
sonal stake, the Roper Court further addressed the question whether a
named plaintiff may appeal an adverse certification ruling after prevail-
ing on the merits of his own claim. Chief Justice Burger commented that
while the Court rejected an interlocutory appeal as a matter of right in
Livesay,"' the Court reaffirmed the right of appeal upon final judgment.47
The Chief Justice suggested that the Court in United Airlines, Inc. v.
McDonald,8 assumed that a named plaintiff could appeal the certifica-
tion ruling after prevailing on the merits. 9
In dictum, the Roper Court expressed firm support for the class ac-
tion plaintiff." The Court stated that the class action procedure is a
response to injuries for which government regulatory action does not
provide adequate remedy.51 The Court further expressed support for




" 445 U.S. at 335 n.7. In Roper, the Court compared the Electrical Fittings patent
validity ruling with the certification ruling in Roper. Id. at 334-35. The Court noted that
petitioners in Roper and Electrical Fittings had the same right to appeal the collateral rul-
ing, since both petitioners could suffer adverse consequences from the ruling. Id
'2 Id. at 336-37.
" Id. Justice Powell dissented, in Roper, criticizing the majority's reasoning on the
issue of the plaintiffs' personal stake in the class certification. Id. at 346. Justice Powell
pointed out that the named plaintiffs' counsel was to receive fees only in proportion to the
damages awarded. Id. at 346 n.2. See text accompanying notes 89-91 infra (discussing plain-
tiffs' obligation to pay attorney's fees).
'5 See 445 U.S. at 336-40; note 19 supra.
'6 See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
', 445 U.S. at 337-38.
" 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
'6 Id. at 390, 394.




class actions as a means of redress for persons economically unable to
sustain their own, small suits.2
Finally, the Roper Court attacked "buying off" tactics. The Court
stated that denying appeal of class certification where the defendant in-
tentionally satisfies the named plaintiffs' claims is contrary to the policy
of sound judicial administration.' The Court further condemned "buying
off" as a waste of judicial resources and a frustration to class action
objectives."
The Court decided United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,'
the same day as Roper. As in Roper, the Geraghty Court allowed a
named plaintiff to appeal the class certification ruling after the named
plaintiff's own claim had become moot. 6 In Geraghty, a federal prisoner,
John Geraghty, filed a complaint challenging the validity of parole guide-
lines. The complaint alleged that the guidelines were inconsistent with
the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act." Geraghty brought the
action on behalf of all federal prisoners subject to the federal parole
guidelines.' The district court denied class certification and granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 9 Refusing to certify the
class, the district court found certification necessary only to avoid moot-
ness. Further, the court found certification inappropriate because
Geraghty's claims were not typical of the entire class." Pending appeal
of both the certification ruling and the summary judgment, 1 the federal
penitentiary released Geraghty.2 The Parole Commission moved to dis-
miss the appeal as moot, but the Third Circuit chose to consider the
mootness issue with the merits of the case.6
2 Id.
U Id
445 U.S. 388 (1980).
Id at 404.
I id. at 391-92; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976). The Parole Commission and Re-
organization Act requires the Parole Commission to promulgate parole guidelines in the in-
terest of public welfare. The Parole Commission continues to employ existing guidelines
that use a matrix formula that takes into consideration various factors concerning the
prisoner and the offense he committed. The matrix yields a time period that the prisoner
must serve before being eligible for parole. See 445 U.S. at 390-92. Sentenced to 30 months,
Geraghty's matrix indicated a range of 26 to 36 months before he would be eligible for
release on parole. See id. at 391-92. Geraghty alleged that the matrix system was inconsis-
tent with the purposes of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act by requiring a
prisoner to serve an excessive portion of his sentence in order to be eligible for parole. Id.
I See Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 429 F. Supp. 737,740 (M.D. Pa. 1977),
rev'd, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), affd, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
Id. at 741, 744.
rd at 740-41.
61 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978).
445 U.S. at 394. Geraghty served 22 months of his sentence and did not have to
serve the remaining eight months because of "good-time credits." Id.
' See 579 F.2d at 241.
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The Third Circuit found that a live controversy existed with respect
to the class action and reversed and remanded the case." The appellate
court reasoned that the mooted claim of the named plaintiff would not
have rendered the case moot if the district court had certified the class
action.65 An erroneous denial of certification by the district court, there-
fore, should not lead to a different result." Accordingly, the Third Cir-
cuit held that when a court erroneously denies certification to a class,
subsequent certification of the class relates back to the denial. The Third
Circuit concluded that the possibility of relation back preserves jurisdic-
tion over the appeal. 7
The Supreme Court granted the Parole Commission's petition for
certiorari in order to resolve both the article III issues and the conflict-
ing approaches to class action mootness employed in the lower courts.'
In a five to four decision, the Court approved the Third Circuit's uphold-
ing of class action viability. 9 The Geraghty Court held that the named
plaintiff's claim of entitlement to represent the class satisfies article III
and is an issue separate from the named plaintiff's claim on the merits."
The Geraghty Court, departing from the traditional personal stake
approach, based its ruling on a flexible interpretation of the mootness
doctrine. 1 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority focused on the per-
sonal stake aspect of the doctrine.72 The majority observed that the pur-
Id at 254.
Id. at 248-49. The Third Circuit based its reasoning on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975). See 579 F.2d at 248-51. In Gerstein, the Court decided that the named plaintiff
could continue representing the putative class until the district court ruled on class certifi-
cation. 420 U.S. at 110 n.11. The decision relied on the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" doctrine, finding that the mootness of named plaintiffs' claims could repeatedly
thwart class certification. See id The United States Supreme Court created the "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" exception in Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S.
498, 515 (1911). See 219 U.S. at 515. The exception applies when the alleged wrong can
recur, but because of temporal circumstances no single plaintiff can keep his case in contro-
versy long enough to have the issue fully adjudicated. Gerstein was the Court's first appli-
cation of the exception to class actions. The exception protects class actions in which tem-
poral circumstances render the named plaintiff's claim moot. See 420 U.S. at 110 n.ll.
579 F.2d at 248-52.
6 Id. The Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of relation back in Gibson v.
Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 100-01 (1871). The relation back doctrine is a fiction by which
the law treats an act done at one time as though the act were done at a previous time. Id
The Court in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), first suggested the application of the rela-
tion back doctrine to class actions. See 419 U.S. at 402 n.11. The actual application of the
doctrine occurred in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). The Gerstein Court held that cer-
tification can relate back to the time of the complaint in cases in which the district court did
not have a reasonable opportunity to rule on the certification before the named plaintiff's
claim became moot. See id at 110 n.11.
" See 440 U.S. 945 (1979) (mem.).
" See 445 U.S. at 390, 409.
, Id at 401-02.
1 See id at 400-01.
7 See id. at 401-04; see note 19 supra.
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pose of the personal stake requirement is to assure adverseness and that
adverseness can be assured by means other than the traditional ap-
proach. 3 The Court developed this premise through .a study of prior
class actions. The prior decisions, including Roper, demonstrated in-
stances in which named plaintiffs continued to represent their classes
after their own claims were moot." In each instance, the Court found
that the named plaintiffs' lack of a traditional personal stake did not
thwart adverseness.
5
The Geraghty Court expanded the Roper issue-by-issue approach."
The Geraghty Court agreed with the Roper holding that the procedural
ruling of certification presents a separate issue from the claim on the
merits." The Geraghty Court further held, however, that the separate
issue arises from the named plaintiff's claim of entitlement to represent
a class. '
The Geraghty Court held that the named plaintiff's claim of a right to
represent a class supplies a personal stake sufficient to satisfy article III
requirements." Applying a flexible rationale to the Geraghty case, the
Court found that the personal stake involved in the appeal of the certifi-
cation ruling cannot meet traditional personal stake requirements." The
Court stated that a procedural claim rarely consists of a legally cogniz-
able interest. The Court found, however, that the purpose of the tradi-
, 445 U.S. at 403-04; see note 74 infra.
"' 445 U.S. at 398-402; see, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
In Gerstein, the Court held that the named plaintiff could continue representing the puta-
tive class until the district court ruled on class certification. See 420 U.S. at 110 n.11; note
67 supra. In McDonald, the Court allowed an intervening putative class member to appeal
the certification ruling after final judgment on the named plaintiffs claim. 432 U.S. at 396.
The statute of limitations ostensibly mooted the putative member's claim before her inter-
vention. See id. at 391-92. The Court sustained the class member's intervention, however,
by relating back the class certification to when the district court originally denied certifica-
tion. Id. at 392. See note 67 supra.
" 445 U.S. at 400.
," See 445 U.S. at 334-35.
' 445 U.S. at 401-02. The Geraghty Court held that a class action raises two separate
issues. The separate issues are the claim on the merits and the claim by the named plaintiff




, The Geraghty Court pointed out that a named plaintiff's right to represent the class
might amount to a legally cognizable interest when the class members are indispensable
parties. Id. at 402 n.8. An indispensable party is a person whose presence is needed for the
just adjudication of the claim. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 70, at
300 (2d ed. 1970).
The Geraghty Court reasoned that a named plaintiffs procedural claim is closely
analogous to the private attorney general concept. 445 U.S. at 402-03. The term "private at-
torney general" is a label applied to actions brought on behalf of the public interest rather
than the private interest of the named party. See generally Homburger, Private Suits in
the Public Interest in the United States of America, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 343 (1974) (in-depth
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tional personal stake requirement is fulfilled when a live controversy
continues to exist and the named plaintiff vigorously pursues appeal.2
Accordingly, the Geraghty Court held that the named plaintiff's asser-
tion of his right to represent the class establishes a personal stake suffi-
cient to allow the named plaintiff to appeal the certification ruling."
Roper and Geraghty both addressed the issue of a class action's via-
bility when the named plaintiff's claim is rendered moot. The holdings,
however, upheld that viability through two constitutionally conflicting
rationales. The Roper Court attempted to meet the traditional personal
stake requirements of article III by asserting an economic interest." The
Geraghty Court's flexible doctrine deviates sharply from the strict per-
sonal stake requirements.8 5
The Court's holding in Geraghty is preferable to the Roper holding.
The Roper holding directly attacks "buying off," but the analysis is un-
sound. In an attempt to conform to the traditional personal stake re-
quirements," the Court created a fictional economic interest. The named
plaintiffs' desire to spread the litigation expenses among the class was
not an economic interest of the named plaintiffs. As Justice Powell
pointed out in his dissent, the Court failed to demonstrate any expenses
for which the named plaintiffs were responsible.' Since the attorney's
fees were to be twenty-five percent of the damages awarded, the named
plaintiffs' share of the fee would have been the same regardless of any
award to other class members.88
The Roper holding actually benefits the named plaintiffs' counsel
since he is the only person to benefit from class certification other than
the absent class members. While the class members' claims are definite,
the attorney's fees are proportional to the judgment awarded. 9 If the
class receives all its aggregated claims, counsel's fees will be substan-
tially higher. The Roper holding aids class action attorneys by pre-
venting the attorneys' loss of time and fees because of mootness.8 The
discussion of private actions in the public interest). The justifications for the class action
procedure are the prevention of inconsistent rulings, judicial economy, and the protection of
absentees' interests. 445 U.S. at 402-03. The Court found the justifications of the private
attorney general concept analogous to those of a class action. Id at 403.
445 U.S. at 403-04.
Id. The Geraghty Court limited Geraghty's stake to the appeal of the certification
ruling. Id The named plaintiff's claim of entitlement to represent a class is in controversy
only until the certification ruling is final. If class certification is successful, the adequacy of
the class representative no longer is in controversy. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(a)(4). If the
district court's denial of certification is upheld on appeal, the adjudication of the named
plaintiff's claim of entitlement will be complete. 445 U.S. at 404-05.
See note 19 and text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
See text accompanying notes 71-83 supra.
See note 19 supra.
445 U.S. at 351-52 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 350 & n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
89 Id.
' Class actions are large and expensive cases. See Developments in the Law- Class
Actions, 89 HAnv. L. REv. 1318, 1353-59 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Developments] (compre-
[Vol. XXXVI
CLASS ACTION MOOTNESS
holding, however, rests the personal stake requirement on an economic
interest of the named plaintiffs' counsel." Any economic interest at-
tributed to the named plaintiffs is fictional.
The flexible doctrine espoused in Geraghty recognizes the short-
comings of the strict, formalistic view of the personal stake requirement.
The Geraghty majority acknowledged that the requirement is riddled
with exceptions.2 The Supreme Court has rationalized the exceptions to
the mootness doctrine on the basis of various continuing aspects of the
named plaintiffs' claims. 3 These continuing aspects include interests
that the plaintiffs retain after their claims on the merits are moot. As in
Roper, the interests remaining in these continuing aspects of the claims
largely are fictional.9
The Geraghty Court harmonized the mootness doctrine with the doc-
trine's exceptions. As the majority pointed out, the Court always has
viewed the mootness doctrine with some flexibility. 5 The Court arrived
at the exceptions to the mootness doctrine through practical and pru-
dent considerations." The Geraghty holding rejected attempts to fic-
hensive discussion of class actions). Many class actions are brought on behalf of persons
with small individual claims. Id. at 1354-55. In order to pay the costs of litigation, class ac-
tion attorneys often operate under a contingency fee arrangement. Id. at 1604-22. The
Roper Court's holding will provide incentive to class action attorneys by preventing class
action mootness before appeal. The risk of losing the attorney's fee thus is reduced. See
Schwartz, The Class Action" Mootness and Decision, N.Y.L.J., April 15, 1980, at 1, col. 1
[hereinafter cited as Schwartz] (projecting the positive impact of Roper and Geraghty on
class actions).
" Even though the named plaintiffs in Roper have received the full amount of their
claim, their attorney can gain from certification. If the class prevails on the merits on re-
mand, the attorney's fee could be 250/0 of $12,000,000. See 445 U.S. 359 n.22 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
1 445 U.S. at 404 n.11; see 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1088 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as NEWBERG] (detailed discussion of exceptions to mootness doctrine); note
25 supra.
0 NEWBERG, supra note 91, § 1090. In some instances an action will survive a challenge
for mootness on the ground that some facet of the original harm suffered continues despite
intervening events. Id. § 1088.
" See id. § 1088. When a named plaintiff's claim does not meet traditional personal
stake requirements, the avoidance of mootness through an exception is based upon the
speculation of future adverse effects or of the recurrence of the alleged wrong. See Moot-
ness on Appeal, supra note 19, at 1678. In United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629
(1953), the Court found that to sustain injunctive relief the proponent must show more than
the "mere possibility" of recurrence of the alleged wrong. 345 U.S. at 633. Subsequent deci-
sions, however, have cited the standard established in Grant for the proposition that the
"mere possibility" of recurrent violation keeps a case from becoming moot. Mootness on
Appeal, supra note 19, at 1683. Exceptions to the mootness doctrine based on the "mere
possibility" standard can become fictional because of the attenuated possibility of recur-
rence. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (challenge to anti-abortion laws in which
Court found plaintiff's terminated pregnancy did not moot action because pregnancy can
happen more than once).
"5 445 U.S. at 404 n.11.
9"Id
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tionalize a situation to meet the formalistic controversy standards or to
create another fictional exception to the mootness doctrine. The Court,
however, did adopt the practical and prudent approach employed in
earlier decisions that created the exceptions to the mootness doctrine.'
Through the flexible approach, the Geraghty Court placed more empha-
sis on satisfying the purposes of the formalistic requirements than on
meeting the requirements themselves.
In addition, the Geraghty holding better resolves the problem of
"buying off" than does the Roper holding. Roper attempted to eliminate
the possibility of the defendant mooting the claim of the plaintiff class. 8
The Roper holding, however, continues to allow defendants to render
class actions moot by tendering the actual or potential expenses of litiga-
tion in addition to the amount of the named plaintiffs' claims.9 While
tendering of the expenses usually is impractical, 0 the Geraghty ra-
tionale eliminates the possibility of that variety of "buying off." The per-
sonal stake in Geraghty can be mooted only by a district court's determi-
nation that the named plaintiff cannot represent the class adequately.''
Thus, the putative class members in Geraghty are invulnerable to the
defendant's "buying off" tactics.
Commentators expect the holdings in Roper and Geraghty to have a
positive impact on class action plaintiffs. The Supreme Court's suppor-
tive position should foster the increased use of the class action pro-
cedure."2 Roper and Geraghty, however, may create more problems than
they resolve. While lower courts now have a clear indication of the
See id.
" See text accompanying notes 36-54 supra.
The holding in Roper allowed the named plaintiffs to appeal the certification ruling
because of a personal stake in the spreading of litigation costs among the members of the
class. If the defendant tendered the litigation costs, the personal stake of the named plain-
tiffs would be eliminated. See 445 U.S. at 339-40.
110 The tendering of litigation costs is impractical for several reasons. First, the actual
costs of litigation in complex class actions usually are high. See Developments, supra note
90, at 1353-59. Thus, "buying off" may become economically infeasible because of the
amount that the defendant must tender in order to moot the named plaintiffs' personal
stake. Second, the Roper holding may require the defendant to tender not just the actual
costs of litigation, but the maximum amount of litigation costs. Since the personal stake in
Roper was the desire to spread the litigation costs among the class members, a defendant
may have to tender the potential amount of litigation costs in order to moot completely the
named plaintiffs' alleged personal stake. See 445 U.S. at 336-37. The potential litigation
costs could be substantial. If in Roper the district court had certified the class action and
the class had prevailed on the merits, the litigation costs would have been at least
$3,000,000. See id. at 359 n.22 (Powell, J., dissenting); note 91 supra. Finally, the defendant
may have to tender the litigation costs more than once if other class members bring suits on
the same issues and attempt to certify the class. The chance is doubtful, therefore, that a
defendant would tender high litigation costs under the risk of having to tender the same
amount in a second suit.
"' See 445 U.S. at 403-07; see note 83 supra.




Supreme Court's support for class actions, the attempt to apply the con-
flicting rationales of Roper and Geraghty to future class actions may
result in contradictory holdings among the circuits.' 3 The application of
Roper and Geraghty also will be of great concern to class action attor-
neys. Depending upon the rationale applied, a different result could
occur in identical cases.'
The employment of different rationales in Roper and Geraghty ap-
parently stems from a split in the Supreme Court over the application of
the article III mootness doctrine. Justices Powell and Stewart stand fast
in their support of the traditional requirements.' In contrast, Justice
Blackmun espouses the flexible approach.0 ' The remaining members of
the Court oscillate between the two extremes."7
The Roper case was a compromise holding. Some members of the
Court were reluctant to adopt the flexible doctrine in a situation where a
traditional rationale could be employed.' 0 The economic interest in
Roper appeared to the Court to satisfy the traditional rationale."'
Geraghty, however, sought declaratory relief rather than damages."'
Since no damages are awarded in a declaratory action, the contingency
arrangement was not used in Geraghty. The named plaintiff in
Geraghty, therefore, could not assert the same economic interest
asserted in Roper."'
While the named plaintiff in Geraghty could not assert the economic
interest asserted in Roper, the named plaintiffs in Roper could not meet
the flexible standards of the Geraghty holding. An important aspect of
the Geraghty holding was that an actual controversy continued to exist
between the members of the class and the defendant."' The Court
demonstrated the controversy's existence in Geraghty through the in-
tervention of an absent member of the putative class."' In Roper, how-
" The Court in Geraghty granted the petition for certiorari to resolve confusion in the
circuits over class action mootness. See 440 U.S. 945 (1970) (mem.); see note 25 supra.
'" See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
10 Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented in both Roper and Geraghty.
445 U.S. at 344; 445 U.S. at 409.
" See text accompanying notes 71-83 supra.
"7 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White joined the majority view in both Roper and
Geraghty. 445 U.S. at 327; 445 U.S. at 389. Only Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
switched from the majority in Roper to the dissent in Geraghty. 445 U.S. at 327; 445 U.S. at
389.
", Based on their positions in Roper and Geraghty, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
White apparently are willing to support the flexible doctrine only when traditional require-
ments are inapplicable. The Justices considered Roper to be a case in which a traditional
personal stake existed. 445 U.S. at 336-37. The Geraghty case, however, did not fit the tradi-
tional mold. See text accompanying notes 112-15 infra.
"' See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
"1 Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 429 F. Supp. 737, 739 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
... See 445 U.S. at 336.
" 445 U.S. at 396.
' Id. In an attempt to save the class action in Geraghty from mootness, a prisoner
named Becher moved to intervene in the appeal of the certification ruling. 445 U.S. at 394.
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ever, no absent class member intervened."' The Roper Court had no
overt indications of a live controversy between the absent members and
the defendant."1 '
Despite the disparity in the two holdings, Roper and Geraghty will
have a positive impact on class actions. While both decisions directly
support class actions, the degree of their impact will depend much on
how the lower courts apply the decisions. In a practical sense, however,
a defendant will not be able to "buy off" named plaintiffs to avoid class
action liability. In addition, the holdings will foster the increased use of
class actions by preventing class action mootness resulting from the
named plaintiffs mooted claim.
GLENN S. THOMAS
The district court denied the petition to intervene. Id. Becher appealed the denied petition
and the Third Circuit consolidated his appeal with Geraghty's. Id.
445 U.S. at 352 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1 See id.
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